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Background: Recent work on cognitive-behavioural models of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder has focused on the roles played by various aspects of self-perception. In particular, 
moral self-ambivalence has been found to be associated with obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena. 
Aims: In this study we used an experimental task to investigate whether artificially priming 
moral self-ambivalence would increase participants’ deliberation on ethical problems, an 
index which might be analogous to obsessive-compulsive behaviour.  
Method: Non-clinical participants completed two online tasks designed to prime either moral 
self-ambivalence, general uncertainty or neither. All participants then completed a task 
requiring them to consider solutions to moral dilemmas. We recorded the time participants 
took to respond to the dilemmas and the length of their responses; we then combined these 
variables to create a measure of deliberation. 
Results: Priming moral self-ambivalence led to increases in deliberation, but this was only 
significant among those participants who scored highly on a baseline measure of moral self-
ambivalence. Priming general uncertainty had no significant effect upon deliberation. 
Conclusions: The results suggest that moral self-ambivalence may play a role in the 
maintenance of obsessive-compulsive behaviour. We propose that individuals who are 
morally self-ambivalent might respond to situations in which this ambivalence is made salient 
by exhibiting behaviour with obsessive-compulsive characteristics. These findings have 
implications for the incorporation of ideas about self-concept into theories of obsessive-
compulsive disorder. 
Key words: obsessive-compulsive disorder; morality; self-ambivalence; self-perception; 
experiment
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Priming moral self-ambivalence heightens deliberative behaviour in self-ambivalent 
individuals 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is considered among the most incapacitating 
anxiety disorders (World Health Organization, 1996), with an estimated lifetime prevalence 
of 1-3% (Torres et al., 2006). Although Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is now a well-
established treatment for OCD (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005), 
there is consistent evidence that 30% of individuals referred for CBT do not benefit from it, 
and only 55% see a benefit 1-6 years after treatment (Abramowitz, 2006). Despite much 
research refining the cognitive model of OCD, the latest meta-analysis suggests that 
treatment effectiveness has not improved substantively over recent years (Olatunji, Davis, 
Powers, & Smits, 2013). Recent developments in cognitive-behavioural models of OCD have 
therefore attempted to make the theoretical models underlying CBT more comprehensive by 
investigating ‘higher-order’ vulnerability factors for the disorder’s development (Bhar & 
Kyrios, 2007; Doron, Kyrios, & Moulding, 2007; Doron, Moulding, Kyrios, & Nedeljkovic, 
2008), in particular those relating to the structure of the ‘self’ (Doron & Kyrios, 2005; 
Kempke & Luyten, 2007). In this paper we explore whether obsessive-compulsive behaviour 
might occur as a response to a salient uncertainty about the status of one’s self as moral.  
The cognitive-behavioural model of OCD is based on the premise that obsessions are 
more frequent and distressing versions of otherwise normal intrusive thoughts (Clark & 
Rhyno, 2005). What leads to those thoughts becoming obsessions is theorised to be a 
person’s appraisal of them (Salkovskis, 1999). Compulsions, in turn, are thought to arise as a 
means for the person to manage the distress that this appraisal causes (Clark, 2004). This 
response leads to the negative reinforcement of compulsions and the maintenance of the 
belief in the significance of the intrusive thoughts. One factor that has been theorised to 
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contribute to these unhelpful appraisals is what the person with OCD fears their intrusions 
imply about the traits they have or might acquire (Aardema & O’Connor, 2007).  
The inclusion of self-perception variables into cognitive-behavioural models of OCD 
is consistent with the idea that obsessional thoughts are often appraised as ego-dystonic, that 
is, inconsistent with a person’s sense of self (Aardema & O’Connor, 2007). Indeed, in one 
study participants with OCD were found to rate their most upsetting obsession as being one 
that contradicted an important aspect of their self (Rowa, Purdon, Summerfeldt, & Antony, 
2005). The present paper focuses on the moral aspect of the self, as people with OCD often 
draw negative inferences from their intrusions in terms of their perceptions of themselves as 
moral beings (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005).  
Experimental research supports a causal link between threats to morality and 
obsessive-compulsive phenomena: Elliott and Radomsky (2009) played female 
undergraduates an audio-recording describing a kiss—either consensual or non-consensual—
with a man who was described as either moral or immoral. In both the consensual and non-
consensual groups, participants reported greater feelings of mental contamination (i.e., 
feelings of dirtiness) when the man was adjudged immoral, and some participants reported 
greater subsequent urges to wash. However, research supporting the notion that threats to 
morality underlie some obsessive-compulsive behaviours does not explain why people with 
OCD misappraise intrusive thoughts as morally-threatening (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007); indeed, 
people ordinarily reject negative information about themselves to protect their sense of self-
worth (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). Research has begun to specify some potential vulnerability 
factors for developing these responses to intrusions (Doron & Kyrios, 2005).  
One vulnerability factor that may be important is moral self-ambivalence. Self-
ambivalence is defined as uncertainty about and preoccupation with a dichotomous self-
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construct. For example, someone might be unsure and concerned about which half of two 
extremes of a dimension, such as morality, they belong to (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). This can 
involve contradictory beliefs about the self, such as “I am a good person” and “I am a bad 
person”, resulting in uncertainty about one’s self-worth and attempts to ascertain the ‘truth’ 
about oneself (Guidano & Liotti, 1983). The finding that intrusive thoughts may escalate into 
obsessions and compulsions because they are experienced as threatening in the context of an 
uncertain sense of self has been theoretically connected to beliefs about inflated responsibility 
(Doron, Moulding, Kyrios, Nedeljkovic, & Mikulincer, 2009). These are beliefs that one is 
instrumentally responsible for preventing harm, which are often key in OCD (Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997; Salkovskis, 1999). Inflated responsibility 
beliefs and responses have been conceptualised as ways of restoring a more certain sense of 
self in the face of threatening intrusions (Doron et al., 2009; Kempke & Luyte, 2007).  
Supporting this theory, in clinical populations correlations have been shown between 
moral self-ambivalence and OCD symptomatology (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007), yet these findings 
call for experimental studies to explore the causality of the relationship (Bhar & Kyrios, 
2007; Doron et al., 2008). Probably the most relevant experimental research is a recent series 
of studies by Doron, Sar-El, and Mikulincer (2012), who manipulated moral self-
sensitivity—a related construct that concerns the placing of considerable self-worth upon 
aspects of morality, yet feeling incompetent in those aspects (Doron & Moulding, 2009). 
Non-clinical participants simply positioned items on graphs, with the labels of the graphs 
designed to make claims either about the participant’s morality, their sports ability, or no 
quality. Participants next read scenarios describing contamination concerns, and rated their 
urge to act in response to each worry, and their likelihood of acting. Participants who 
received negative information about their own morality reported the greatest urges and 
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likelihoods of acting, suggesting that threatening participants’ sense of morality motivated 
them to neutralise that threat. However, this research only assessed participants’ reported 
urges to act, not their actual behaviour.  
In the present study, we tested whether a manipulation involving moral self-
ambivalence would provoke greater deliberative behaviour when resolving ethical dilemmas: 
a variable that we argue could be analogous to obsessive-compulsive-like behaviour. We 
predicted that the effect of this manipulation would be particularly strong for participants 
with a pre-existing tendency to be self-ambivalent in the moral domain, because it is these 
participants who should be most motivated to act in response to moral ambiguity (Guidano & 
Liotti, 1983). To this end, we used priming tasks with participants intended to temporarily 
increase the salience of either moral self-ambivalence, general uncertainty, or neither. All 
participants then responded to moral dilemmas. Like other similar studies, we measured the 
time participants took to respond (e.g., Arntz et al., 2007); as an additional measure of 
deliberation we also calculated the length of their written justifications.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants responded to an advertisement on a University research recruitment 
webpage, with the only eligibility criterion being that their first language was English. To 
improve the sample size and diversity, participants were encouraged to pass the study details 
on to others. A total of 217 adults (68% female, 32% male; MAge = 21.73, SD = 6.30) 
completed the online study, and were entered into a prize draw to win £25. Participants were 
randomly allocated by the online experimental software to either the Experimental, 
Uncertainty control, or Neutral control condition.  
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Measures 
The Self-Ambivalence Measure (SAM; Bhar, 2004) comprises two subscales: self-
worth ambivalence and moral ambivalence. The Moral Ambivalence subscale most strongly 
predicted endorsement of inflated responsibility beliefs in previous research (Bhar & Kyrios, 
2007), therefore we only used this subscale, which has six items. Respondents rate their 
agreement with each item using 5-point scales (α = .80 in this sample). 
Participants also completed the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Assessment (GAD-7; 
Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006; α = .89 in this sample), the Patient Health 
Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001; α = .87 in this sample), and the 
Checking and Contamination subscales of the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised 
(OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002; α = .86 and .81 in this sample respectively) to provide measures of 
anxiety, depressive symptomatology, and OCD-related compulsions.  
There were no significant differences across conditions on the SAM, F(2, 195) = 0.08, 
p = .93, the GAD-7, F(2, 195) = 0.36, p = .70, the PHQ-9, F(2, 195) = 0.46, p = .63, the OCI-
R (Checking subscale), F(2, 195) = 0.30, p = .74, or the OCI-R (Contamination subscale), 
F(2, 195) = 0.11, p = .90; participants overall scored low on all measures (Table 1). 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Procedure 
 Our procedure was approved by the University of Surrey’s Ethics Committee. 
Participants first completed the measures described above, followed by the experimental 
manipulation tasks, and finally our moral decision-making task. 
Experimental manipulation 
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Two tasks were used to prime either moral self-ambivalence (in the Experimental 
condition), general uncertainty (Uncertainty control condition), or neither (Neutral control 
condition). We used two tasks—the first more ‘implicit’ and the second more ‘explicit’—to 
maximise the chances that moral self-ambivalence or general uncertainty would be activated. 
All participants completed both tasks, but the stimuli used in each task differed dependent on 
which of the three conditions the participant had been allocated to. 
Task 1: Unscrambling sentences. The first task required participants to unscramble 
20 five-word sentences. This method has been used to repeatedly expose participants to a 
target concept, thus priming it (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). For Experimental and Uncertain 
Control participants, half of the sentences were primes, which were mixed in with fillers. 
Priming sentences in the Experimental condition were based on descriptions of moral self-
ambivalence in the research literature and the SAM (see Appendix). Priming sentences in the 
Uncertainty Control condition were adapted from Experimental items to refer instead to 
general uncertainty. The task in the Neutral Control condition consisted entirely of fillers 
taken from prior studies’ priming tasks and supplemented by others devised by us. 
Task 2: Writing about experiences. In the second task, all participants wrote about a 
past personal experience. Participants in the Experimental condition wrote three details about 
a time when they were unsure whether they were a good or bad person; those in the 
Uncertainty Control condition wrote about a time when they were uncertain; and those in the 
Neutral Control condition wrote about a time when they made a decision. This task was 
derived from research into attitudinal uncertainty (e.g., Grant & Hogg, 2012). Our only 
criterion for judging participants to have successfully completed this task was that they wrote 
a relevant sentence in all three boxes; this was determined by the first author alone, who 
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inspected participants’ responses separately from all other data in order to achieve blindness 
to condition. 
Moral decision-making task 
Finally, participants were presented with five scenarios from Greene, Nystrom, 
Engell, Darley, and Cohen (2004), and asked for each to decide whether a particular course of 
action is right, and to justify their answer. All scenarios represented cases in which causing 
harm to one person could prevent harm against a greater number of people. As with Task 2, 
participants were judged to have successfully completed this task if they wrote a relevant 
sentence in all five boxes; this was determined by the first author blind to condition. We 
measured response time (how long participants took to respond to each scenario, as measured 
automatically by the online software) and response length (the number of characters they 
used in each response). 
Results 
Nineteen participants were excluded from analysis either because they failed to follow 
instructions (e.g., writing nonsense strings of letters as responses), or because they spent 
more than three standard deviations above the mean time to complete the three tasks. This 
latter criterion was used because priming effects are typically short-lived (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000), and the online nature of the study precluded us from verifying that 
participants completed it without disengaging. The excluded participants (58% females; MAge 
= 18.47, SD = 0.77) came approximately equally from all three conditions (7 Experimental 
condition; 7 Uncertainty Control; 5 Neutral Control). This left 198 participants for analysis 
(69% females; MAge = 22.04, SD = 6.50). There were no significant differences across 
conditions in terms of age, F(2, 195) = 0.98, p = .38, or gender, χ2(2) = 5.90, p = .052; 
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however, because the gender differences were marginally-significant, we accounted for this 
in the analysis reported later. 
We categorized as ‘high’ in moral self-ambivalence those participants whose SAM 
scores were more than one standard deviation above the sample mean. This categorisation 
applied to 32 participants; the remainder were categorised as ‘low-medium’ in moral self-
ambivalence. Table 1 contains psychometric scores for the two groups. We averaged the 
response time and length data across the five moral dilemmas, and log-transformed these 
values to correct for skewness. We assumed that these variables would represent different 
indexes of the same thing: the extent to which participants deliberated when responding to the 
ethical dilemmas (indeed, the two were strongly correlated, r = .73). Therefore, we 
maximised statistical power by using a principal components analysis (PCA). This technique 
permits the reduction of two or more collinear variables into fewer factors that each measures 
a unique construct. In this way, we reduced both transformed variables into one combined 
measure, which we label ‘deliberation’. This component had an eigenvalue of 1.73 and 
explained 86.4% of the overall variance. The deliberation scores obtained from the PCA were 
therefore used in all analysis. It is noteworthy that these scores were not correlated with SAM 
scores (r = .05; p = .51); we return to this point in the Discussion. 
 We ran a two-way univariate ANOVA with Condition (Experimental vs. Uncertainty 
control vs. Neutral Control), and Moral Self-Ambivalence (High vs. Low-Medium) as the 
independent variables. The analysis revealed a non-significant main effect of Moral Self-
Ambivalence, F(1, 192) = 0.06, p = .94, η2p < .001, and a marginally-significant main effect 
of Condition, F(2, 192) = 2.83, p = .06, η2p = .02. There was, however, a significant two-way 
interaction, F(2, 192) = 3.12, p = .047, η2p = .03 (Figure 1). Follow-up analyses showed that 
the effect of Condition was significant among participants who scored highly on Moral Self-
10 
 
Ambivalence, F(2, 29) = 3.58, p = .04, η2p = .20, but not among those in the low-medium 
range, F(2, 163) = 1.78, p = .17, η2p = .02. Planned contrasts showed that highly self-
ambivalent participants’ deliberation scores were significantly greater in the Experimental 
condition than in the other two conditions, t(29) = 2.66, p = .01, r = .44. The Uncertain and 
Neutral Control groups did not differ, t(29) = 0.47, p = .64, r = .09. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We repeated the above ANOVA controlling for participants’ anxiety, depression and 
checking scores (all of which differed significantly by Moral Self-Ambivalence; Table 1) and 
gender (which differed marginally by Condition). The two-way interaction remained 
significant, F(2, 188) = 3.36, p = .04, η2p = .04, and the main effect of Condition became 
significant, F(2, 188) = 3.27, p = .04, η2p = .03. There was no main effect of Moral Self-
Ambivalence, F(2, 188) = 0.01, p = .91, η2p < .01. 
Discussion 
Our data show that experimentally priming moral self-ambivalence increased the 
deliberation that individuals invested in responding to moral dilemmas, but only among 
participants with high baseline levels of moral self-ambivalence. The effect can be compared 
to laboratory studies in which participants whose inflated responsibility was primed took 
longer and made more checks to sort medication into containers (Arntz et al., 2007); such 
measures have been posited as analogues of obsessive-compulsive behaviour. Although 
previous experimental research has challenged participants’ perceptions of their morality with 
explicitly negative information (Doron et al., 2012; Teachman & Clerkin, 2007), this study is 
the first to demonstrate an effect on individuals’ actual decision-making behaviour, and that 
this can be related to trait moral self-ambivalence. 
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Because participants’ deliberation scores were not correlated with their SAM scores, 
it seems unlikely that deliberation was merely a behavioural manifestation of moral self-
ambivalence. Instead, it is more likely that our priming tasks increased the salience of certain 
participants’ pre-existing self-ambivalence, rather than increasing moral self-ambivalence per 
se. Several possible mechanisms might underlie our effect. For example, by investing greater 
deliberation into their dilemma responses, self-ambivalent participants might have been 
attempting to restore confidence in their own morality after their ambivalence had been made 
salient. Alternatively, this salience might have been cognitively disruptive for self-ambivalent 
participants, perhaps causing their reasoning to be less straightforward. Further investigations 
would be needed to confirm whether these or other mechanisms are responsible, and our 
novel priming methodology could be used in such research. In this case, though, it would be 
important to validate our presumption that moral self-ambivalence was indeed the construct 
activated. Here we inferred that the manipulation was successful on the basis that it produced 
the predicted effects upon deliberation; nonetheless without a direct manipulation check we 
cannot rule out the possibility that we actually activated some alternative construct with 
compatible effects. Relatedly, it would be useful to know whether both priming tasks were 
successful in this regard, or whether the observed effects were driven by just one task. 
Our findings build upon recent efforts to update the cognitive-behavioural model of 
OCD, which have shown that negative self-appraisals may be significant in the development 
of the disorder (Doron et al., 2009; Ferrier & Brewin, 2005; Kempke & Luyten, 2007). 
Specifically, this study provides further indication that ‘higher-level’ cognitive vulnerabilities 
such as moral self-ambivalence contribute to OCD symptomatology (Doron & Kyrios, 2005). 
The wider theoretical implication is that models of OCD could benefit from being expanded 
by incorporating constructs underlying key belief domains such as inflated responsibility 
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(Doron & Kyrios, 2005; Solem, Myers, Fisher, Vogel, & Wells, 2010). Expansion of this sort 
would increase the explanatory power of cognitive models of OCD aetiology (Marker, 
Calamari, Woodard, & Riemann, 2006), as well as identifying broader factors that 
interventions could target. Whereas previous research into the aetiology of OCD has focussed 
on potential developmental pathways for inflated responsibility (Salkovskis, Shafran, 
Rachman, & Freeston, 1999), understanding developmental pathways that lead specifically 
towards moral self-ambivalence may further improve explanatory models.  
 Of course, one cannot assume that our findings would be replicated in people who 
meet diagnostic criteria for OCD. Indeed a limitation was the relatively small proportion of 
participants with high levels of moral self-ambivalence. However, if the results were 
replicated in a clinical sample with more participants ‘high’ in moral self-ambivalence, then 
this might offer support for addressing moral self-ambivalence directly in clinical work. This 
notion fits with Doron and Moulding’s (2009) recommendation for addressing the self-
perception of clients who do not benefit from classical CBT. Further studies should also 
explore the conditions under which moral self-ambivalence will be most likely to lead to 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour. For example, such behaviour might be less likely among 
people who perceive the moral self as less important, or among people who are capable of 
effectively neutralising or suppressing intrusive thoughts (Julien, O’Connor, & Aardema, 
2007; Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2005).  
In conclusion, our findings suggest that when individuals who are morally self-
ambivalent experience situations that make this ambivalence salient, their vulnerability to 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour might be heightened. 
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Table 1. Participants’ mean psychometric scores overall and split into subgroups by moral 
self-ambivalence. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Measure Maximum 
possible 
score on 
scale 
Whole 
sample 
Moral self-ambivalence 
subgroup 
t-statistic 
for 
subgroup 
contrast 
   Low-
medium 
High  
SAM (Moral 
ambivalence subscale) 
24 7.27 (4.67) 5.74 (3.26) 15.22 
(2.03) 
21.61*** 
GAD-7 21 6.82 (4.98) 6.05 (4.46) 10.81 
(5.64) 
4.51*** 
PHQ-9 27 7.47 (5.48) 5.74 (3.26) 15.22 
(2.03) 
4.86*** 
OCI-R (Checking 
subscale) 
12 3.44 (3.11) 3.15 (2.97) 4.94 (3.42) 3.04** 
OCI-R 
(Contamination 
subscale) 
12 1.72 (2.24) 1.65 (2.19) 2.09 (2.47) 1.03 
** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Appendix 
(Unscrambled) Sentences used in the Unscrambling Sentences task. 
Experimental  Uncertainty control  Neutral control and fillers 
I fear doing something immoral. 
I’m either "good" or "bad." 
Am I a moral person? 
Everyone knows I am 
untrustworthy. 
I worry about my behaviour. 
I constantly question my 
conscience. 
I cannot meet ethical standards. 
Should be a better person. 
I don’t know what’s right. 
I have questionable moral 
judgement. 
 
I fear doing something 
ambiguous. 
I’m either "sure" or "unsure." 
Am I a decisive person? 
Everyone knows I am uncertain. 
I worry about my decisions. 
I constantly question my 
doubts. 
I cannot meet inconclusive 
standards. 
Should be a certain person. 
I don’t know what’s correct. 
I have questionable everyday 
judgement. 
 
Throw the red ball silently. 
He observes people watching 
him. 
Please wrap the gift neatly. 
She bought the sentimental 
item. 
I wash the clothes frequently. 
Let us play or sing. 
Warm sunlight makes raisins 
wrinkle. 
They hardly picked the apples. 
This black drink seems bitter. 
He occasionally knits them 
jumpers. 
She studies texts with him. 
Shall I send it over? 
They are from Surrey 
University. 
What a great colourful parrot. 
He saw the train leave. 
They often meet him there. 
Do you play football too? 
They go dancing every 
weekend. 
Replace the clock batteries 
soon. 
Buy the cheapest ticket online. 
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Figure caption 
Figure 1. Participants' mean deliberation factor scores derived from response times and 
lengths, as a function of experimental condition and moral self-ambivalence. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
 
